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One of the topics of the Republic is to determine the role of the poet within the ideal city. 
While the poets, including Homer, are categorically expelled from the ideal city in Book 
X, numerous Homeric and poetic influences, references, and illusions can be seen 
throughout the Republic. Starting with the first word κατέβην and ending with the Myth 
of Er. I determine the nature of justice in the Homeric worldview to be ‘doing that to 
which you are allotted’, which is the same as justice is initially presented in Book IV of 
the Republic. I argue further, that there is not a shift in the moral tone of the Odyssey 
from the Iliad, and that by investigating the actions of the two protagonists of these epics 
a unity between them may be drawn. Due to the numerous other poetic influences on the 
Republic, and that the Homeric epics can be read as containing the same notion of justice, 
I conclude that Plato’s presentation of justice initially in Book IV is essentially a 
borrowed concept from Homer. In the successive books of V-IX, Plato builds a 
philosophical foundation on which to show the superiority of justice to injustice. In the 
course of these arguments, justice itself is deepened and made into a more robust notion 
that was initially presented in Book IV. I argue, at the end of the Republic, the nature of 
justice appears to be different, while actually being a deepened, clarified, and more robust 
concept than its initial presentation. 
 






I came to this topic through a general curiosity regarding the ancient Greek 
concepts of justice. Initially, I wanted to produce a broadly schematic layout of the major 
theories of justice from the Archaic to the Hellenistic age. This monumental undertaking 
had to be reined in by my advisors over and over again as I attempted to investigate 
topics that would have been more appropriate for a PhD dissertation or a lifetime of 
work, rather than a Master’s thesis. I have to thank my advisors, Dimitrios 
Yatromanolakis and Richard Bett, for what seems like constantly curbing the manic 
impulses of my mind for this project.  
In large part, I began studying philosophy in order to understand Plato, the first 
philosopher that I was introduced to in the 5
th
 grade by my grandfather. From then on, I 
was hooked. I was forced to bide my time, however, until I could take philosophy courses 
in college, which I jumped into with relish. This thesis, in some ways, reflects the 
culmination of my initial fascination with Plato all those years ago.  
This work is dedicated to my parents, Craig and Sue, without whom I would not 
be where I am today. I am eternally grateful for their guidance and wisdom throughout 
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Note to the Reader: 
All translations of the Iliad will be from the 1924 Murray edition unless otherwise noted. 
All translations of the Odyssey will be from the 1919 Murray edition unless otherwise 
noted. 





Introduction: Avoiding the Modern Semantic Baggage of ‘Justice’ 
The first century BCE historian Diodorus wrote: “Who could speak highly 
enough of training in the art of writing? By this means alone the dead speak to the living, 
and through the written word those who are widely separated in space communicate with 
those remote from them as if they were neighbors” (Bibliotheca Historica 12.13.2)
1
. This 
quote coyly leaps over any and all of the many obvious obstacles and potentially 
bewildering barriers that block the path toward understanding an author’s intentions with 
its copious potholes. The spirit of the quote, however, is to say that the author’s intentions 
may in fact be gleaned from a text regardless of the wide separation in space and time, is 
a sentiment that has inspired this current undertaking.  It is this ability of the written 
word, to place the reader in the presence of the author and to attempt to commune with 
him or her, which has made this hermeneutic undertaking possible. 
 The rediscovery of writing after its loss following the collapse of the Mycenaean 
culture
2
 and its development into an influential medium of communication from the end 
of the 8
th




 BCE is centrally important to a foundational 
understanding of this work. This quarter-millennium period of rapid change from the 
rediscovery of the written word to the Classical Age of Athens parallels the philosophical 
development of the ancient Greek world. The focus of this work will be the reception of 
the extant Archaic epic poet Homer by Plato in the fourth century. More specifically, I 
will consider how Plato understood the vital role of the poet in society and how his 
exclusion of the poets from his ideal city is not total, since Plato extends the Homeric 
                                                 
1
 Translated by Barron in Easterling and Knox (1985; 90). 
2
 Sometime between c. 1200-1100 BCE. 
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 as a mechanism by means of which every class within the ideal city 
may utilize this virtue effectively in their daily lives. The delicate interplay between the 
Archaic and Classical ages as it appears in the context of this thesis is not only 




Since dike in Greek is typically translated into English as ‘justice’, the word 
immediately provokes images from modern English-speaking cultures in the mind’s eye 
of the reader
6
. The word justice in English, consequently, has many connotations, which 
must be shed off before approaching this Greek concept. Just as one would change one’s 
attire to suit the environment, so one must change one’s mental costume in order to suit a 
change in cultural environment. It is imperative that these immediate, subtle, and 
typically sub-conscious associations of justice are brought to the forefront of the reader’s 
mind so that they may be deliberately laid aside. The temporal barrier alone, with all of 
its obfuscating qualities, separating the ancient Greeks from us would warrant such a 
cautious approach to the topic. This is not the only difference, though, that must be 
addressed so that the reader may be aware of the topic outlined above.  
As regards nearly every aspect of culture there are significant and divisive 
disparities between the ancient Greeks’ and our own. One must struggle constantly to 
                                                 
4
 This Homeric notion of justice is presented in the first half of Book IV. I argue, ultimately, that by Book 
X Plato extends his initial notion of justice into something more robust than it was by Book IV. Even with 
this redefinition, Justice as it is presented in Book IV is vitally important to the project of the Republic. 
5
 As an influential scholar aptly puts it in a discussion of early Greek poetry: “Such writer as Gorgias, 
Protagoras, and Euripides… were not for the most past introducing radically new techniques or attitudes, 
but rather exploiting, systematizing, and exaggerating possibilities that they found already well developed 
by their predecessors” (Griffith 1990; 187). 
6
This hermeneutic problem applies to all readers of the text regardless of language as it is very difficult to 
access Plato in the way an ancient audience would have, and furthermore to glean from the text the exact 
intention of Homer and Plato’s use of dike. 
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keep these disparities in the forefront of one’s thought in order to properly begin 
addressing and understanding the complexities that existed within this culture that has 
drawn so much attention from both the popular and scholarly communities. 
Homer was not a philosopher; this statement may seem obvious but is the root of 
various issues within some scholarship. As such, there will be inconsistencies within the 
texts if rigorous philosophical methods are used. Nevertheless, these inconsistencies do 
not damage the worth of the text because Homer was not attempting to create valid 
philosophical arguments. He presented a worldview that was not philosophical. Instead of 
pressing Homer on the inconsistencies within the text and being confused by them, the 
scholar would do better to seek out general patterns that are woven throughout the 
Homeric worldview. These general patterns then lead the scholar to a better 






Doing what is appropriate: dike in Homeric Epic 
The ability of dike to permeate every aspect of life in the classical Greek tradition 
is apparent through the breadth of works in which it appears and plays a vital function.  
Such areas as: epic, lyric poetry, philosophy, politics, history, tragedy, and comedy, all 
touch on this concept in their own unique and meaningful way. Because of the 
significance of dike, several influential modern works have been written on the concept, 
its historical development, and a wide-ranging interpretation of it (Lloyd-Jones 1971 and 
Havelock 1978 to name a couple). The scope of my thesis is smaller than those large-
scale discussions of dike. As such, I will primarily investigate the concept as it appears in 
Homer and Plato.
7
 More specifically, the present thesis will be a discussion of how 
Plato’s use of dike in the Republic can be interpreted simultaneously as a reaction against 
and a borrowing of the dike displayed in the extant epics of Homer. Further, the scope of 
this thesis includes the extent to which Plato’s famous condemnation of poetry is 
significant regarding his understanding and utilization of dike in the Republic. This work 
will demonstrate that Plato simultaneously borrows the Homeric notion of justice as 
Socrates defines it in the first half of Book IV
8
 of the Republic and extends this notion of 
justice to its most robust formulation at the end of Book IX. This leads to a kind of 
‘paradigm shift’
9
 in the centuries after Plato. Further, it is this presentation of dike in the 
later books of the Republic that presents dike in a more robust philosophical light with 
                                                 
7
 My discussion of Plato’s work will be limited to the Republic. The Republic, though, is not the only text 
with which justice may be approached as it appears in Plato; in fact there are 6 other dialogues that discuss 
the topic. The primary reason for the focused scope of this M.A. thesis is due to both time and length 
constraints applied to this research project.  
8
 In Book IV Plato defines justice as “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” 
(Republic 434a), and in relation to the different classes: “the money-making, auxiliary, and guardian classes 
doing what is appropriate, each minding its own business in a city” (Republic 434c). 
9
 I borrow this term from Thomas Kuhn’s 1962 work The Structure of Scientific Revolution in order to 
illustrate the magnitude of the change in the philosophic discourse that Plato introduces.  
6 
 
substantial arguments made on its behalf, being built up from the foundations of a 
philosophical system, for the first time in the European philosophical tradition and 
fundamentally altered the way that justice was characterized and conceptualized for 
millennia. This will give some context and justification to the influential assertion that 
“the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it 
consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead 1979; 39).  
While this M.A. thesis only discusses Homer and Plato in depth, this does not 
mean that these two authors are the only influential thinkers in the Greek tradition that 
discuss dike. Other authors from the Greek world have been excluded from the scope of 
this text because Plato has a special, if highly complicated, approach to Homer that 
appears again and again throughout the Republic. I have decided to investigate this 
special treatment of Homer by Plato in the Republic and determine if Plato’s love of 
Homer manifests itself through some special treatment, or by finding a way to include 
some aspects of Homeric thought into his ideal city. This is not to say that the material 
from other authors or their influence should be doubted or disregarded; on the contrary, 
there are many fascinating and deeply sophisticated uses of dike other than in the works 
that will be discussed here which the reader would be well advised to delve into due to 









). However, their work will be excluded from this thesis primarily as it is 
beyond the scope of the research question at hand. 
 
                                                 
10
 See Beall (2006). 
11
See Henderson (2006). 
12
 See Dolgert (2012). 
13
 See Ahrensdorf (2011). 
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Potential Hermeneutic Barriers to the Interpretation of the Problem 
Before the text of Homer may be discussed, there is one important issue that 
needs to be addressed so that its full force may be recognized in the discussion of Homer. 
That issue is the role that the early Greek epics would have played within archaic Greek 
society
14
. As regards the wider literary tradition, Homer seems to fit very well into the 
broadly understood category of “national epics” in preliterate societies—to use 
terminology applied to literate societies (Havelock 1978; 25). To this extent they 
functioned as a cultural history, that is, a storage-container for many aspects of the 
society’s secular knowledge, in addition to theology. This means that these epics were 
used to keep a record of those societies’ historical achievements: cultural, militaristic, 
artistic, etc. —almost all aspects of the culture were embedded in these epics. This 
cultural record is authenticated by the gods of the society through the role that they play 
within the epics (Havelock 1978; 25). Since the gods of this society both were the 
progenitors of the Homeric heroes and stand in as the creators of history, they are 
understood as a unifier of culture. In other words, the gods in question act as the 
justification for both the authenticity and truth of the epics. These oral histories are the 
culmination of a group’s achievement as symbolized “in the form of victories over other 
groups, feats of prowess or daring and the like” (Havelock 1978; 25), which connect the 
society with their gods and their ancestors. In addition to the Epic’s role in society, the 
manner of the presentation and memorization of the epics—if we understand them as 
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 For this question I found the Cambridge Companion to Homer (2004) to be very helpful, especially the 
chapters by:  Scodel ”The story-teller and his audience” , Foley “Epic as genre”, Dowden “The epic 
tradition in Greece”, Osborne “Homer’s Society”, and Hunter “The Homeric Question”.  
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oral—is a point of especial interest. The use of meter in Homeric epic creates a sort of 
music in the ear of the listener and the head of the speaker such that  
[It] makes some demand on the memory, but the act of recall is relatively 
easy because rhythms are repetitive; that is their essence; they can provide 
a spell, a standardized incantation to which the words of a required 
statement can be fitted so that as pronounced they reproduce that rhythm. 
Once so placed, they remain relatively immune to the arbitrary change or 
imperfect recollection, for their order cannot be shifted. (Havelock 1978; 
26)  
In this way, meter is a tool that allows for a greater sum of information to be stored and 
accessed in a ritualized manner than is possible without it. This frames the presentation 
and reception of the information in a way which provides some noteworthy insight into 
how people would have interacted with these narratives.  
Yet, what does it mean for the epics to be oral? An important anthropological 
distinction needs to be drawn between oral composition, oral transmission, and oral 
presentation (Yatromanolakis 2007). It seems reasonable to suppose that the epics were 
presented to audiences orally. The evidence for this is apparent and there are several 
defensible reasons for the claim that the Homeric epics were performed orally. Most of 
the arguments revolve around the grammar of Homeric Greek, the word choices, the use 
of formulaic language, and the reiteration of the exact text by messengers throughout the 
epic, which would make a ritualized memorization of the text easier for the bard (Lord 
Bates 1960). These appear to be the best available explanations to the question regarding 
the oral performance of early Greek epic. Furthermore, the possibility of oral 
transmission seems plausible, if not always provable. Modern Middle Eastern countries 
give us some excellent examples of how massive amounts of a text can be memorized. In 
more conservative parts of the Islamic world, children are taught to memorize the entirety 
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of the Qur’an—a work of no small size
15
 (Boyle 2004). The reason for this modern 
example in the present work is that there might be fundamentally different ways in which 
oral cultures interacted with their narratives
16
 than literate societies do with their 
literature. As such, if we attempt to understand how Homer was transmitted in early 
Greek society, it is of outstanding importance for modern scholars to be familiarized with 
the manner in which oral societies functioned through either the active participation in 
fieldwork of traditional societies or through a deep and wide ranging investigation into 
the fieldwork of anthropologists (Yatromanolakis 2003). This will give us a better 
understanding of the plausibility of the oral transmission of Homeric epics. Oral 
composition of the Homeric epics is the last of the possible meanings of ‘oral’ and it is 
the least provable and plausible of the different types.
17
 This is a complex issue and will 
not be addressed at much length here because, at present, there is no way of definitively 
defending the assertion that the epics were composed orally. Yet, it is at least important 
to note the possibility of oral composition
18
. One aim, here, is to understand dike as 
Homer and his initial audiences would have understood it. For this reason, it is vital that 
we understand the intention as well as the intellectual arguments, whether stated 
explicitly or not, which can be pieced together from the epics. Only after this may one put 
Plato’s reception of them into a proper context. 
                                                 
15
 The Qur’an is divided into 114 chapters and is roughly equivalent to the New Testament in size. For 
reference to the Qur’an, I suggest M.A.S. Abdel Haleem’s translation (2004).   
16
 Since literature, strictly defined as such, cannot be attributed to an oral society. 
17
For the concept of orality I find Lord Bates’ work The Singer of Tales (1960), Ruth Finnegan’s works 
Oral Poetry (1977), and Literacy and Orality (1988), and Walter Ong’s work Orality and Literacy (1982) 
to be the most helpful. 
  
18
 Even if oral composition is not very plausible, it cannot be ruled out, and any serious consideration of the 
epics must keep this possibility in mind during its argumentation so as to not diminish the possibility space 
of the issue being addressed. 
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Two of the more hotly debated topics in Homeric scholarship, as to whether 
Homer is one person or more and when precisely the Homeric epics were first composed, 
have little relevance for the current work
19
. Any comparisons between the texts of the 
Iliad and the Odyssey will not be tied up intimately in Homer necessarily being one 
person. For example, my assertion that the moral climates of the Odyssey and the Iliad 
are essentially the same is founded and dependent on an analysis between the two texts 
themselves. This claim in no way requires them to have been composed by the same 
author. Further, because Plato understood the author(s) of the Iliad and the Odyssey to be 
one person it will be helpful, for the present work, to understand Homer through the same 
lens as Plato
20
. One major goal of this M.A. thesis is to properly understand the reception 
of Homer by Plato. For this reason it will be useful to refer to Homer as a single 
individual; nevertheless, this does not require that the assumed identity of Homer, as one 
person, is inseparably tied up in the arguments that will be made. In addition, regarding 
the debate surrounding the dating of the Homeric epics, it bears little on the discussion 
here because they were written well before Plato, and this clear temporal distinction
21
 
between the Archaic and the Classical period is all that is needed for the validity of the 
arguments made in the present thesis. 
 Where to begin then, if not at the beginning of the Greek tradition; as is often the 
case with all things Greek, the beginning is Homer. It is with him that we catch our first 
glimpse of dike. In Homer, dike is not an abstract principle, such as a modern audience 
would understand justice. Rather it acts as a principle that regulates actions between 
                                                 
19
 For the issue of the Homeric Question, both West (1999) and West (2011) are extremely insightful. 
20
 For a historical introduction to the Homeric Epics I find Clarke (1981) and Graziosi (2002) for the early 
reception of Homer to be helpful. 
21
 This clear temporal distinction spans nearly a quarter-millennium from possibly the end of the 8
th
 century 







. It can, therefore, be described as an act-centered conception. 
The extent to which the gods are concerned with mortals is concentrated on their actions; 
they punish and reward actions based on how that particular action aides or hinders the 
societal fabric of the divine and mortal communities.  
In this chapter, I suggest that dike as it is presented in the Homeric epics closely 
resembles the virtue of justice as Plato presents it in book IV of the Republic: “having 
and doing one’s own and what belongs to one’s self would be agreed to be justice” and 
“the moneymaking classes, auxiliary, and guardian classes doing what’s appropriate, 
each of them minding its own business would be justice” (Republic 434a and 434c, 
respectively). This will suggest a borrowing of Homeric justice for use in Plato’s ideal 
city. This point of view will be argued for in opposition to a recent assertion by William 
Allan that dike in the Homeric epics is best understood as an ordering of the cosmos 
(Allan 2006). I argue that if a reader understands dike as a divine ordering of the cosmos, 
this would only provide the reader with a limited understanding of dike and its function in 
the epics. There is a richer reading of the text than is possible if dike is Zeus’ ability to 
prevent the activation of tensions amongst the divine community. Homeric dike may be 
understood as an ordering of the cosmos because it is irrevocably bound to Zeus and his 
ability to generally appease the other gods. I do not mean that dike is the happiness of all 
the gods, because such a statement would be unreasonable. In Allan’s understanding of 
dike, rather, it is Zeus’ ability to prevent the activation of tensions and quarrels amongst 
the gods. I argue that Allan’s cosmic order, while potentially being just, is not ‘justice’ 
itself. Rather, ‘justice’ itself in the Homeric epics is each person doing what is 
                                                 
22
 By this, I claim that Homeric dike does not include intention in its ethical arithmetic.  
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appropriate and has been allotted for them to do. Allan, then, describes things within the 
Homeric epics that are just but fails to see ‘justice’ itself in the Homeric epics in his 
attempt to draw a unity between the extant early Greek epics. I will, therefore, proceed by 
arguing the merits of my conception of dike and then turn back and address the perceived 
flaws in Allan’s conception.  
A Unity between the Iliad and the Odyssey  
Divine conflict is a constant theme in both the Iliad and the Odyssey. In the Iliad 
this can be seen in several different scenes. The first of three scenes which I will discuss 
is in book four (Iliad 4.29) as Zeus incites Hera to a fight about the duel between 
Menelaus and Paris. The second instance is in book sixteen (Iliad 16.443) as Hera scolds 
Zeus for considering saving Sarpedon. The third instance is in book twenty-two (Iliad 
22.181) as Athena warns Zeus not to let Hector escape the wrath of Achilles. In all of 
these three instances the same phrase is used: ἕρδ᾽ ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες 
ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι “do it but be sure that the other gods will not approve.” In all of 
these instances Zeus is contemplating changing something that has long been fated to 
occur, and in each of these cases the response is exactly the same. Even though it is 
possible to change the fate of a mortal, the cost of such an action
23
 far outweighs the 
benefit it may bring. Zeus is not bound to different rules than the other gods, and the fates 
of mortals are simply untouchable—even if every god wishes to intervene for their 
favorite hero. From a philosophical perspective, this is extremely confusing since there 
are contradictory views on how fate functions and what the gods may or may not do in 
relation to it. In one view, Zeus has the raw physical power necessary to enact the change 
                                                 
23
 It would cause all the other Olympians to disapprove and potentially begin a revolt. 
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he wishes; the other view states that a mortal’s fate is unchangeable. These views are in 
opposition and cannot both be correct. It appears, however, that the issue is within the 
text itself and if examined leads to a confused understanding of the relationship between 
the gods and fate. 
Strangely enough in the epics, it does not appear that Zeus lacks the ability, or 
more precisely the raw power, to change the fate of a mortal
24
. Instead, it appears that 
Zeus understands and respects the role of the Fates and the necessity not to tamper with 
the lot of any mortal as this would trigger tensions amongst the divine community. This 
may seem bizarre at first coming from Zeus, the same god who constantly brags about 
how much greater his power is than all the other gods (Iliad 8.18-8.27). Zeus is ultimately 
unwilling to save Sarpedon and Hector because both have been πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ 
(Iliad 16.441, 22.179) “long doomed by fate”. These heroes being long doomed by fate 
demonstrate a power that is higher than the will of Zeus or the other gods. While Zeus 
may possess the raw power to change the fate of a mortal, fate, is deemed higher than the 
will of the gods.  
Further, in the Odyssey, Zeus’ ability to prevent tensions amongst the divine 
community from growing and potentially threatening the divine order of the cosmos is 
shown by Zeus giving his approval to Athena so that she might help Odysseus on his 
homeward voyage. Odysseus is fated to return to Ithaca and preventing this homeward 
voyage eternally would be a disruption of the cosmic order. Athena tells Odysseus that 
she was unwilling to openly disregard the will of her uncle but once Poseidon was absent 
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 It would seem quite the contrary. Zeus is in fact capable of changing the fate of a mortal; his 
contemplation of this action implicitly shows the reader that this action is within the realm of possibility for 
Zeus, even if it is forbidden. 
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from Olympus she could go to Zeus, lobby her complaint, and receive his support 
(Odyssey 13.341-342). After Zeus’ support is given to Athena, there is nothing in 
Poseidon’s power to do. Essentially, Poseidon cannot win a contest of power against his 
elder brother. In this scene from the Odyssey, Zeus acts as the divine arbitrator of the 
dispute between Athena and Poseidon, allowing the cosmic order to be maintained. 
Further, his arbitration avoids a potential conflict between the two deities that might 
polarize the community which would threaten the divine order of the cosmos. In this way, 
there is a link between the justice of the Iliad and the Odyssey; it is the constant 
maintenance of the cosmic order by heroes doing that to which they are allotted with the 
help of the gods.    
This statement itself, drawing a unity in the conception of justice as it is portrayed 
in the Iliad and the Odyssey is seen by some scholars as an unpersuasive move (Kullman 
1985).  The central thesis of such a counter argument is that there is an “incompatibility 
of the religious conceptions of the two epics” (Kullman 1985; 14). This position is even 
held by such noted scholars as Hugh Lloyd-Jones; even after he undermined the 
developmental model of moral justice in early Greek epic, Jones believed that there was a 
difference in the moral climate of the two epics (Lloyd-Jones 1971; 28, 30). As I will 
demonstrate, though, Lloyd-Jones and other prominent scholars were incorrect in 
asserting that the moral climate of the Odyssey is different from that of the Iliad.  
 After investigating two primary examples, one from the Iliad and one from the 
Odyssey, a clearer unity between the two epics may be seen. The two examples are the 
actions of Achilles and the actions of Odysseus throughout their respective epics.  
15 
 
The case of Achilles here is not only an extraordinarily interesting one, but an 
illuminating one because it helps explain how Homeric dike not only affects but is also 
contingent on certain actions taking place in the mortal realm. The Iliad, famously, 
begins by telling the muse to sing the μῆνιν or ‘rage’ of Achilles. Nevertheless, this rage 
is not uselessly destructive or horribly negative on the grand scale, for Achilles’ μῆνις is 
furthering the will of Zeus (Iliad 1.5). As a result, his wrath has a purpose; which is to 
speed up the fated fall of Troy, and consequently, maintaining the cosmic order by doing 
that which is allotted to him. There are some scholars who propose that Achilles’ actions 
are just, regardless of any “indiscriminate destruction because that sanction preserves an 
order which is far preferable to chaos” (Muellner 1996; 7-8). In this way, order, however 
harsh, is far preferable to chaos which is deemed to be unlivable. Even if one is to accept 
this argument, though, there must be a lingering shadow of a doubt about why so many 
innocent people, who have no direct stake in the feud between Agamemnon and Achilles, 
must not only suffer from the feud but also be killed on account of it. This construction of 
the argument, that the order is preferable to chaos due to the unlivability of chaos seems 
to oversimplify the text. This description of justice appears to ‘write a blank check’ to 
whatever action that needs to be described as just. With such a definition every action in 
the Iliad may be seen as just because it plays a role in the preservation of the divine 
cosmic order, however terrible the consequences. If every action may be seen to be just, 
then there is no useful way of distinguishing the value of any given action. Without the 
ability to evaluate actions, justice loses much of its traction. I would not contend that 
Homer espouses the notion that all actions are just. Furthermore, justice in the Iliad and 
Odyssey is not a static concept; by this I mean that Homer does not create a world in 
16 
 
which the characters may not take action and have the walls of Troy fall or Odysseus 
return home. Action must be taken by the agents within the system so that the fated 
outcomes may occur.  Chaos ought to be seen as the most extreme consequence of divine 
or human will not doing the task to which they are allotted by fate. Not every action has 
the potential to create chaos, though. Chaos is an extreme; the imposition of Zeus’ will to 
prevent this chaos from damaging the cosmic order is a mollification, an easing, a 
moderation of that potential chaos. Zeus, in his role as arbiter, is constantly reining in the 
excesses of the other gods and mortals, whether it is Poseidon’s rage with Odysseus or 
Achilles’ rage with Agamemnon.   
As the Iliad progresses, Achilles develops morally as a hero (Lutz 2005-2006). 
The final development is his understanding and acceptance of the injustices that he has 
caused throughout the epic. Yet, the picture of Achilles that is painted in the first book is 
very different from that in the last book. In the first book, Achilles appears to understand 
justice, not as doing that, to which he is allotted, but rather a societal recognition of 
excellence and the doling out of goods based primarily on successes in war
25
. If Achilles 
can be said to understand justice in this way in the beginning of the Iliad, then naturally it 
follows that Achilles’ choice to leave the war in Book I is due to the breaking of what is a 
just principle in his mind. Even if Achilles is not aware of justice as doing that which is 
allotted to him, but rather as a societal or political recognition of excellence in war, this 
does not exclude justice functioning this way. Achilles’ attitude betokens only his 
ignorance, at least in book one, of the true nature of justice in the Iliad. There is evidence 
                                                 
25
 This is primarily a social or political understanding of justice as it relates to the regulation of 
interpersonal relationships. A man may only be just in so far as his actions are just, and those actions 
require the presence of a social fabric. Without some sort of social fabric, in Homer, it would be impossible 
to comprehend what a just man would be like. 
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to support the claim that Achilles clashes in many ways with societal norms in the Iliad. 
At the outset of the Iliad, Homer acknowledges that Achilles’ wrath plays a significant 
role in the progression of the epic on a grander scale than the simple dispute between 
Achilles and Agamemnon (Iliad 1.5). In other words, there is more at stake for the 
Achaeans than whether Achilles receives proper compensation or not; the fate of Troy, 
whether it will fall or stand, is fundamentally attached to Achilles’ choice to fight or not.  
During the course of the Iliad Achilles goes through a period of rejecting the 
heroic code, at first, based on the injustices that he has endured, and the unresponsiveness 
of the rest of the Argives to let “the best of the Achaeans” suffer this injustice (Iliad 
9.323-344).  This phase of Achilles’ development has been seen by some scholars as 
being itself an injustice (Lloyd-Jones 1971; 26). In Lloyd-Jones’ conception, Achilles is 
committing an injustice by withdrawing and allowing his fellow countrymen to die. This 
injustice committed by Achilles is only heightened by Achilles’ abject refusal, as told to 
Odysseus, to accept Agamemnon’s seemingly spectacular offerings of compensation 
(Iliad 9.312). Achilles choice in Book I, Book IX, and Book XVI to withdraw, and stay 
withdrawn, from the fighting is unjust. While his absence could be seen as the necessary 
catalyst for the death of Patroclus as it is fated, and may be construed as helping aid the 
fulfillment of the divine order on a larger scale. It does not, however, aid in the fall of 
Troy. In the Iliad, moving the plot toward the eventual fall of Troy, even though its fall is 
not depicted in the Iliad, is the issue with which all the actions of the epic are concerned. 
It is against this fated end which everything in the epic ought to be weighed; does it help 
fulfill this end, and thereby aid in the maintenance of the cosmic order, or not? If so, the 
action is just, if not then the action is not.  
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Further, his subsequent promise to Telemonian Ajax, to return to the fighting only 
if the Trojans begin to burn the ships (Iliad 9.676), is a further injustice because it is an 
immutably strong stance on the matter. A more flexible stance here may be seen as just 
because it would show his comprehension and periodic reevaluation of the evolving 
nature of the conflict. At the very least, such a periodic reevaluation would reflect an 
acknowledgement of the losses being suffered by his comrades as a result of his absence. 
Such an immutably strong stance cannot help either party involved, and in fact, is a 
severe detriment to one of the parties and the maintenance of the cosmic order. For this 
reason, Achilles’ immutably strong stance in Book IX is unjust.  
One view of the matter is that these injustices committed by Achilles are the 
necessary catalysts, which allow Patroclus to ask Achilles to lead the Myrmidons into 
combat in order to save the ships from being burnt. Ultimately, this act by Patroclus leads 
Hector to overcome him and is the provocation that returns Achilles to the fighting; thus, 
the plot of the epic is propelled forward by the slow buildup of injustices that Achilles 
creates and suffers. The result is that Achilles’ injustices cause the cosmic order to 
function as it ought to. Achilles’ choice to refuse fighting is not the proximate cause of 
Patroclus’ death, nor would have Achilles’ presence in the battle guaranteed Patroclus’ 
safety. If Achilles had ordered Patroclus to pursue a line of action, and that direct line of 
action caused his death, then Achilles very well might have been the proximate cause of 
his death. Achilles gave an express order to Patroclus to not pursue the Trojans past the 
ships (Iliad 16.80-100). Yet it was this hubris that drove Patroclus to his fated death. 
There is no guarantee, then, that Achilles was directly involved with the actions that led 
up to Patroclus’ death. Since Achilles actions were not involved in Patroclus death, 
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Achilles’ injustices cannot be seen to be speeding up the fated fall of Troy or maintaining 
the cosmic order. The unfortunate consequence, therefore, is that Achilles’ actions up to 
Book XVIII may be characterized as unjust. Even this, what could have been seen as 
potential threat to a coherent notion of dike in the Homeric epics, in the proper light may 
be an explanatory tool. 
 Not only does the death of Patroclus propel Achilles to action, but it also allows 
the plot of the epic to move forward. The death of Patroclus forces Achilles to take 
another step forward in his moral development as the protagonist of the epic. At this 
point, it is possible to understand Achilles’ actions as being driven by a concept of justice 
which “means, more than anything else, helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies 
(Iliad 16.31)” (Lutz 2005-2006; 118). It is at this point in the epic that Achilles shifts his 
wrath from avenging a perceived injustice by Agamemnon, to avenging the death of his 
friend. His goal is to thereby help restore Patroclus’ honor through the death of Hector. 
What is important is that the object of his wrath has shifted from some personal injustice 
to avenging the injustice done to a friend. Undoubtedly, this is a step in the right 
direction. This shift in the object of Achilles’ wrath is a telling sign of some moral 
development because, for the first time in the epic, Achilles is willing to put aside his 
own personal interests, in the sense that those interests pertain specifically to his timê, 
and pursue a line of action which is for the better of his countrymen. Additionally this is a 
cause taken up for a friend. Any distinction drawn between his two motives here is of 
little import. After all, even if Achilles does return to the fighting not to help his 
countrymen, but to avenge Patroclus, he is putting the interests of another in front of his 
own and should be understood as living a new theory of justice—which is to help friends 
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and hurt enemies. This is a step forward for his moral development through the epic, yet 
at this point Achilles is still not conforming to the nature of justice within the Iliad. His 
moral development is complete only when he comes to this realization. In this phase of 
the epic, Achilles is neither aware of how his actions are necessary for the fall of Troy, 
nor is he aware of justice as doing that, which is allotted to him. It is true, though, that at 
this point he is aware that his choice will lead to his own death as he will have chosen 
between the two possible scenarios laid out for him by his mother (Iliad 9.410-416). But 
he is neither aware of how he will win eternal glory through a short death
26
, nor how 
necessary he is for the Fall of Troy. 
 It is not until the last book of the Iliad that he finally accepts the death of 
Patroclus, and more importantly realizes that his actions cannot do anything to return 
Patroclus from Hades.  This process of grief, which Achilles goes through, allows his 
wrath to subside. It is this calming of Achilles wrath that allows him to, for lack of better 
words, ‘see the bigger picture’ and accept the divine order of things, which he had 
wanted to control until now. It is only here in Book XXIV that Achilles becomes aware 
of what justice is and how his actions help to maintain the cosmic order. All of this takes 
place after Priam’s speech to Achilles in book twenty-four (Iliad 24.544). This scene is 
transformative for Achilles because, during the dialogue, Achilles develops in two ways. 
First, he becomes truly human and integrates himself wholly into society by realizing the 
rights of others, and thereby limiting his own claims so that he can rejoin the community 
(Lutz 2005-2006; 124). This allows Achilles to participate in the community in a more 
harmonious manner. Second, it is through a fear of Zeus that Achilles gives back the 
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 He is only aware of a vague outline of his fate. 
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body of Hector (Iliad 24.138-139) and this exemplifies the role of Zeus in the epic as 
arbiter.  
What is left to be seen is how the Odyssey portrays the same sort of Justice as the 
Iliad. The Odyssey traditionally has been, and is still, commonly approached by the 
mistaken view that the Odyssey creates a divine world that is substantially different from 
that of the Iliad (Burkert 1997; 259). Such a view is even held by Hugh Lloyd-Jones as 
he states “that [the Odyssey’s] theology is in some important ways different from that of 
the Iliad” (Lloyd-Jones 1971; 28).  This reading interprets a change in the moral tone of 
the Odyssey. I believe that this view promotes a change in the moral tone of the Odyssey 
because the Odyssey more explicitly deals with morality, and is therefore easier to 
interpret. A better view may be that in the Odyssey there is simply less grunt-work to be 
done—less searching to find how dike functions. The ethical discussions in the Odyssey 
are rather more straightforward than in the Iliad, but this doesn’t mean that there is a 
shift. Homer’s implied attitude toward justice is more easily discerned in the Odyssey. 
However, I will forward, hopefully convincingly, that the moral climate and justice are 
the same in both epics.  
As concerns the argument that the moral climate of the Iliad and Odyssey are the 
same, the best place to begin is the opening words of the epic by Zeus. In this speech 
Zeus brings up the death of Aegisthus by the hands of Orestes (Odyssey 1.32-43). Zeus 
uses this example to condemn mankind’s inability to accept their own role in the 
responsibility for their destruction (Odyssey 1.32-35). As such, Zeus is trying to illustrate 
a point here, not make a definitive shift in the morality of the Odyssey. As Allan points 
out “scholars and translators often fail to give the καὶ in line 33 its full force, since it 
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implies ‘they suffer because of their own wickedness in addition to the trouble sent by 
us’” (Allan 2006;16 n. 73). Tsagarakis had already come to the same conclusion a few 
years earlier in stating “the καὶ makes all the difference here” (Tsagarakis 2000; 47 n. 
163). This opening speech is often cited as an outright change in the tone of the Odyssey 
(Kearns 2004). However, I would argue quite the opposite.  
Firstly, this complaint by Zeus at the opening of the Odyssey is quite simply just 
that—a complaint. It should not be understood as more. It does not represent a wholesale 
change in the approach that the gods will take concerning the actions of mankind from 
the Iliad. In this case, it is wrong to put the emphasis on the role that humans play in their 
own destruction because the story that is about to be told—the Odyssey—clearly makes 
the reader aware of the role of the gods as a large source of human suffering (Allan 2006; 
17). This much ought to be evident as Poseidon is the reason for Odysseus’ delay on his 
homeward voyage. Now, an argument could be forwarded that fundamentally 
understands a reading of the Odyssey as a major discussion of the role that men play in 
their own destruction. However, such a reading does come to “a deep seated disjuncture: 
one of the Odyssey’s best known incidents does not conform to its dominant ethical 
categories, as exemplified by the fate of the suitors and the paradeigma of Aigisthus. This 
is surprising at least and calls for an explanation” (Allan 2006; 18).  
What is in tension with the opening speech of Zeus is the wrath of Poseidon, 
which is driven by personal and familial ties, and is primarily motivated by revenge and 
not an abstract principle of right and wrong (Allan 2006;19). This would be in tension 
with the reading of Zeus’ opening speech, if we frame the actions of the Odyssey in a new 
moral light. This reading of the opening speech wants to assert that the tone of the 
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Odyssey is different. Further, that all of the subsequent action in the epic conforms to this 
new, truly ethical—as a modern reader would understand it—standard. Simply put, 
Poseidon does not conform to this new standard, nor are his actions used as a sort of 
moral exemplar of how one ought not to act. For this reason, based on Zeus’ opening 
speech and Poseidon’s wrath there is good motive to cast doubt on claims about the 
change in the moral tone of the Odyssey.  
Concerning the divine community, another similarity may be drawn between the 
Odyssey and the Iliad. It is the unwillingness of gods of a lesser rank to disregard the 
clout of a god who has higher authority whether this takes the form of a generational gap 
or of a younger sibling or the submissiveness of a wife. In the Iliad there are several cases 
of this. The most prominent case in the Odyssey is a similar disagreement between 
Athena and Poseidon; in fact, this is the driving force of the first half of the epic until 
Odysseus finally lands on Ithaca’s shore. In this case, it is not until Poseidon leaves 
Olympus, as Athena tells Odysseus, that she may discuss the matter of Odysseus’ return 
home with the other gods (Odyssey 13.341-342). This is due to her trepidation; she is 
afraid of openly disagreeing with a god who is mightier. However, after she receives the 
approval of Zeus to help Odysseus return home (Odyssey 5.28-43) she accepts Odysseus’ 
prayer to land on the shore of the Phaeacian land. In this way, the divine community in 
the Odyssey still acts very similarly to how they did in the Iliad. They still follow the 
same rules and customs and still resolve their conflicts in the same way by having Zeus 
arbitrate the issue. Therefore, it is very difficult to believe that there is any radical shift in 
the actions or nature of the gods in the Odyssey from the gods in the Iliad. In the same 
vein as the Iliad, the example of Poseidon’s wrath in the Odyssey is not of a different 
24 
 
nature; but rather it is more of the same. His wrath towards Odysseus is driven by his 
desire to seek personal vengeance and avenge the loss of his son—Polyphemos. Such a 
motivation is nothing new to any reader of the Iliad and is well reflected in Achilles 
actions to revenge Patroclus.  
Further, if the change in the moral tone were to be a correct reading, then 
Poseidon’s destruction of the Phaeacians is more disturbing than first thought. This is 
because of how dear to Poseidon the Phaeacians were, since their king and queen are both 
descendants from Poseidon himself (Odyssey 7.56-66). The example of the Phaeacians, 
their fate and their willingness to aide Odysseus, is a wonderful example of the same 
conception of dike as is in the Iliad—doing that which is allotted. The allotted action is 
the destruction of the Phaeacians, and Poseidon fills the role of the destroyer. Poseidon is 
clearly angered by the actions of the Phaeacians, who up until this time were precious to 
him. Because of the choice that the Phaeacians made, he seeks to destroy them.  This 
action is fated, and Zeus gives Poseidon permission to destroy the Phaeacians. Thus, the 
Phaeacians willingness to aide Odysseus forwards the maintenance of the cosmic order 
by fulfilling the prophesy. This is how one ought to understand the role of Poseidon’s 
wrath towards the Phaeacians; they were fated to be destroyed for helping a stranger and 
Poseidon fulfilled that role (Odyssey 5.564-572). Zeus, as the guarantor of the cosmic 
order, gives his consent. Thus, these actions allow fate to proceed and be fulfilled. The 
fulfillment of this prophesy and the maintenance of the cosmic order may be seen as an 
example of justice in the Odyssey. While it is disturbing, to the moral sentiments of a 
modern audience this does not mean it is inconsistent; quite the contrary, it is the same 
sort of justice that it omnipresent in the Iliad.  
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There is yet another issue with a reading such as Kullman’s, who states that there 
is an “incompatibility of the religious conceptions of the two epics” (Kullman 1985; 14).  
The actions of Odysseus and his men fit well into the moral categories of the Iliad. The 
episode to which I refer is the eating of Helios’ sacred cattle and the ignoring of 
Teiresias’ warning that the cattle of Helios should not be eaten (Odyssey 11.105-11.116). 
As a result of their actions, Helios is allowed to take revenge on them because they have 
transgressed him. However, in order for him to do so he had to first threaten the cosmic 
order (Odyssey 12.382-383). Zeus cannot allow this potential threat to come to fruition 
and consequently gives Helios permission (Odyssey 12.385-388).  
Further, Odysseus’ choice to go visit the Cyclops is disastrous for his men. Not 
only was he at fault for going into the cave, but also, upon his escape, he boasts to the 
Cyclops and let’s slip his name. As a result, the Cyclops prayed to Poseidon and asked 
for revenge against Odysseus specifically. This childish act endangers all of Odysseus’ 
companions and himself, solely to appease his ego. This act of hubris is clearly not just, 
but neither is it unjust; in proper context it should be viewed as being hubristic and 
unintelligent. These actions do not seem to fit well with what some would like to deem a 
new moral tone of the Odyssey. Similar actions can be seen throughout the Iliad, one 
example is Achilles attempting to fight with the river god Xanthus
27
 (Iliad 21.233-283). 
The similarity between these two scenes is that both of the heroes seemingly could not 
control themselves and their natures took over, so much so that the results of their actions 
bring them to the brink of death.  
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Odysseus’ indiscriminate and potentially excessive revenge, which he exacts on 
the suitors, provides further evidence to support my thesis—that justice functions in the 
Homeric epics as one doing that which is allotted—under proper examination. In the 
scene described in Book XXII, Odysseus’ wrath appears to be bordering on bloodlust and 
extending into the realm of injustice. There are two suitors who are considered to be good 
men—Amphinomus and Leiodes—and both are killed in addition to the other suitors 
(Odyssey 22.153-6 and 22.326-9 respectively). They appear to have done no wrong, and 
Odysseus even kills Leiodes while he is in the middle of supplicating to Odysseus. 
Potentially, this is a grave offence against Zeus, the protector of suppliants. Further, 
Amphinomus treats Odysseus respectfully when he appears as a beggar; gives him bread 
and treats him kindly and Odysseus praises him for being a good man (Odyssey 18.120-
153). Yet he is killed by a spear thrust from Telemachus. This is all potentially disruptive 
unless their deaths are put into a larger context. Both men were fated to die as shown 
when “Athena drew close to the side of Odysseus, son of Laertes, and roused him to go 
among the wooers and gather bits of bread, and learn which of them were righteous and 
which lawless. Yet even so she was not minded to save one of them from ruin.” (Odyssey 
17.360-364). Since all of the suitors were doomed to die, Odysseus’ killing of the 
supplicating Leiodes can be seen as just. It must be seen as just and overriding the neglect 
of the supplicants rights and the potential wrath of Zeus because by killing Leiodes 
Odysseus is maintaining the cosmic order by doing that which is allotted to him. The 
same holds true for the death of Amphinomus. Odysseus does go too far and borders on 
disrupting the cosmic order and acting unjustly in Book XXIV; and it takes a warning 
from Athena and a lightning bolt from Zeus to prevent him from going to war against the 
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suitors’ kinsmen (Odyssey 24.528-536, 24.537-544). Odysseus was about to take his 
wrath too far and potentially disrupt the cosmic order by taking action that had not been 
fated. Zeus as the arbiter had to prevent this and made a settlement between Odysseus 
and the kinsmen (Odyssey 24.472-486). Despite this, such a brutal act can be seen as 
portraying the same use of justice and morality as the Iliad. Interestingly, in a related 
article Clarke goes so far as to say that “the punishment of the suitors is more than an 
example of reciprocal vengeance: it is an enactment of absolute and timeless justice” 
(Clarke 2004; 88).  It would seem that, if we understand the basic moral tone of the Iliad 
and the Odyssey to be the same, one then comes to a much better reading of the texts. In 
other words, the epics present themselves in a coherent and internally consistent manner 
if this approach to dike is used. 
Homeric dike as doing that which is Appropriate  
By examining episodes from both epics and the actions of the protagonists of each 
epic, justice may more easily be seen just as Plato presented it in Book IV of the 
Republic: “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (Republic 
434a), and “doing what is appropriate, each minding its own business” (Republic 434c) . 
Further, the ultimate arbiter and guarantor of this justice is Zeus. His will, though, is not 
justice as was demonstrated by several instances within the Iliad where Zeus is 
contemplating pursuing an action that was not fated and he does not pursue that action. 
There is a will that is higher than Zeus’. Zeus’ task is to maintain the order of the cosmos; 
that ordering of the cosmos is not itself justice though. Nor is the will that is higher than 
Zeus’ justice either. Justice in the Homeric epics is each person doing that which is 
allotted to them in order to allow the cosmic order to be maintained. For Zeus, justice 
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manifests itself in his warnings to Odysseus and Achilles in Book XXIV of their 
respective epics and his arbitration of divine conflicts. For Achilles, it is returning to 
fighting so that the fated fall of Troy may occur. For Odysseus, it is returning home and 
killing the suitors. Injustice manifests itself in the epics through an attempt to delay, 
inhibit, or prevent that which was fated to occur. By reading dike in the Homeric epics 
this way, a coherent unity can be found that clarifies issues of justice that appear in other 
interpretations of Homeric dike.  I believe ultimately, that for the clarity and simplicity 
which this interpretation provides, Homeric dike ought to be read as Plato presents justice 
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 to varying degrees. In these authors, 
however, dike is not engaged with as deeply as in Plato. This is not to say that the 
material from other authors or their influence should be doubted or disregarded—quite 
the contrary. With this in mind, it must also be noted that Plato’s Republic acts as a sort 
of ‘paradigm shift’ in the Greek tradition—with regard to the centrality of dike. As such, 
the Republic is one of the first works to which scholars flock when attempting to engage 
with dike in the Greek tradition. This is not only the case for Plato’s own understanding 
of dike, but also for his engagement with traditional notions of justice. Moreover, “the 
Republic has generally been regarded as the high-water mark of Plato’s philosophical 
career” and can be seen as the “culmination of [his] philosophical reflections” (White 
1976, 89).  
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Socrates’ interest in Homer during the course of the Republic
37
 demonstrates a 
special, if not highly complicated, approach to Homeric poetry. He creates a scathing 
critique of poetry that appears to categorically deny Homer’s entrance to Plato’s ideal 
city which is well summed up with Socrates’ words: “though a certain love and reverence 
for Homer
 
that has possessed me from a boy would stay me from speaking… yet all the 
same we must not honor a man above truth” (Republic 595b-c). This attitude which 
Socrates portrays, in addition to the increasingly severe critiques of the poets from the 
ideal city in Books II, III, and X might, at first, lead one to assume that the Republic 
would be devoid of poetic, especially Homeric, influence. This rejection of the poets 
would amount to a rejection of the foundation of Hellenic culture—Homer.  
Despite this, numerous scholars have found Homeric themes throughout the 
Republic
38
. The first of which is the opening word: κατέβην. This word, katabasis, has 
mythological undertones as it is the word used for a trip to the underworld (O’Conner 
2013; 59). Alone, this word isn’t easily tied to the Odyssey; however, when in 
conjunction with the Myth of Er, which has been read as a retelling of Book XI in the 
Odyssey (Klonoski 1993, and Bloom1991; 427)
39
, a Homeric influence on Plato’s 
Republic can be drawn. This is not the only Homeric or Poetic influence that can be seen 
in the Republic. The Republic, in its entirety, is a kind of “large tale, dramatic, myth-
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 Socrates’ specific interests with Homer are the values he believes Homer to be teaching the youth of 
Athens, Homer’s reliance on mimesis, and the implications of the mimetic action on one’s ability to access 
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31 
 
laden, poetic” (Klonoski 1993; 256). These aspects of the Republic stand in stark contrast 
to the rejection of poetry from the city.  
Despite the eventual expulsion of the poets from the ideal city, Plato is constantly 
engaging with Homer. One of the most salient features of the Republic is that Socrates is 
extremely hesitant and uneasy to dismiss the poets from the city because of his love for 
Homer (Republic 595b, 383a, 391a, 468d, 605c-d).  Furthermore, with Homer referred to 
as the educator of the Greeks (Republic 606e), would it be at all possible for Plato to 
salvage some aspects of Homer, in order to use them in his own ideal city? Since Plato 
was influenced by Homer, and parallels between aspects of the Republic and the Homeric 
epics can be drawn, in what ways does Homer exert his influence on Plato? Put another 
way, what, if any, Homeric themes can be identified in the Republic? In this chapter I 
argue for two fundamental points. First, that Plato borrows the nature of justice which is 
presented in the Homeric
40
 epics, using it as a sort of ‘place-holder’ in Book IV, because 
the eventual picture of justice would not make sense without the long argument that he 
makes in the metaphysical Books of V-VII, and the psychological Books of VIII and IX. 
Second, that justice is indeed presented in two similar ways, with some important 
differences, once in Book IV and the other in Book IX. The former may be understood as 
a ‘place-holder’ that functions reasonably well within the platonic framework, while the 
latter makes use of much more sophisticated and nuanced arguments that require the 
construction of a larger philosophical framework in order to sustain the argument and 
bring the dialogue to its eventual conclusion. The view that there are two separate yet 
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linked arguments for justice is supported by Plato himself as in the beginning of Book 
VIII. The reader is told that the conclusion in Book IV
41
 was premature (Republic 543c-
544b). Therefore, the presentation in Book IV is not complete and needs material 
between Books V-IX to finish the argument.  
Socrates states in the third book of the Republic that before the poets may be 
accused of lying, the nature of justice must be understood (Republic 392c); “This 
suggests that in order to understand what is at stake with poetry, one must come to 
understand in some way the nature of justice” (Mei 2007; 755). Socrates’ statement 
demonstrates that there is an implicit link between the poets and justice in Plato’s 
thought. I posit that Plato’s condemnation of poetry is not complete because of Plato’s 
borrowing of a traditional notion of justice
42
. I claim that Plato manipulates what is 
initially a social and political construct, an act-centered theory of justice, and extends it to 
the soul, making it an agent-centered theory of justice (Dahl 1991). That is to say, justice 
in Plato’s ideal city functions both interpersonally, as it helps regulate the actions of 
people and groups amongst each other and themselves, and intrapersonally, because any 
given action has ramifications to the health of the soul and one’s place in the 
afterlife/rebirth cycle.  
For this reason, it is important to understand the extent to which Plato’s 
condemnation of poetry is influenced by his unease with the moral teachings of Homer. It 
is also important, how much, or to what degree, Plato separates from the epic past, and if 
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 Mimesis as it is presented to the reader in book III (Republic 393c) has a narrower scope and in book X it 
has a broader scope .This broader scope of mimesis in book X allows the critique to become a 
epistemological critique of the poets (Republic 598-599). 
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such a break is as radical as some scholars have speculated
43
. I believe, that instead of 
such a radical shift in thought as is typically categorized, Plato’s theory of justice in the 
Republic represents an “exploitation and exaggeration of possibilities embedded in the 
works of predecessors” (Haubold 2010; 29). In this case, the predecessor is Homer
44
.  
  Several of Plato’s works may be understood as addressing dike in one manner or 
another, even if the discussion of dike is not the main thesis of those works
45
. These 
works are: the Republic, Laws, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Gorgias, and Politicus
46
. 
However, traditionally the subheading of Plato’s Republic, and its primary thesis, is 
understood to be ‘on Justice’
47
. For this reason, amongst others, it is with this dialogue 
that people typically begin in order to get some grasp of Plato’s views on justice
48
.  
One breakdown of the Republic which is appealing, if only for the clear divisions 
that it makes, states that the dialogue could easily be broken down into two distinct parts. 
The first book serves as an introduction of sorts, and appears to be akin to the aporetic 
early dialogues of Plato
49
. However, this defense of justice in Book I only seems 
convincing, and is not really convincing, which is why the rest of the Republic is 
needed—to convince Glaucon and Adeimantus.  
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 See Stalley (2003). 
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 See Kosman (2007). 
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Plato’s view of dike, in his other works, may be founded in a firm knowledge of Plato’s magnum opus. 
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 See Tarrant (2000). 
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The rest of the Republic, Books II-X, is clearly understood as Plato’s (through the 
mouth of Socrates) full-throated and exhaustive defense of justice, not just as a social 
principle, as Homer envisioned justice, but also as a personal virtue of the soul.  One 
important aspect of the first book is its depiction of popular morality to Plato’s 
contemporaries and this depiction of popular morality is significant to Plato’s 
condemnation of poetry in Books II, III, and X. The first condemnation hinges on the 
poets’ ability to be a positive moral agent in society
50
, while the second condemnation is 
an absolute critique of poetry for philosophical reasons as the poets cannot help people 
access and have knowledge of the Forms. These books will be addressed in due course; 
however, what may be even more enlightening than Plato’s discussion of his own views 
is his depiction of popular morality in the first book through Cephalus, Polemarchus, and 
Thrasymachus. Socrates seeks out the philosophical flaws that are inherent in popular 
morality and makes them apparent. At the close of the first book it is clear that Plato 
wants to insert philosophy into the moral void which he perceives has been created by the 
false ideals of popular morality and the agnosticism of the sophists. In simpler terms, one 
goal in the Republic is to create a comprehensive, philosophically based, moral system 
which is intended to function as a replacement of the moral systems that exist in 4
th
 
century Athens. First, the opposing views in Book I must be laid out, so as to fully 
understand why this book is included in the Republic and how Plato is able to move 
beyond them. 
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so is avoided. 
35 
 
Book I: Popular Morality in Plato’s Eyes 
The Republic opens with Socrates describing his return from Piraeus with 
Glaucon. The dialogue moves toward Socrates and Cephalus discussing many things, 
moving from topic to topic and making Cephalus appear to be the expositor of the 
traditional views concerning many subjects (Stauffer 2001; 26-27). The topic which 
Socrates eventually steers Cephalus toward is justice. The root of Cephalus’ argument 
states that justice is speaking the truth and giving back what one takes (Republic 331d). 
Socrates questions such a view through an example that returning a weapon to a madman, 
which was taken when he was sane, is not just (Republic 331c). Cephalus declares, then, 
that he must go attend to sacrifices and cannot bother to think about these things. 
Therefore, he hands the argument over to his son Polemarchus (Republic 331d).  
After Cephalus’ departure, Polemarchus forwards another version of justice; this 
time it is a quote from Simonides “it is just to give to each what is owed” (Republic 
331e). This conception of justice, with some gentle prodding from Socrates, allows for a 
circumnavigation of the criticism Socrates brought to the first definition of justice. For 
surely, even if one friend owed the weapon to the other he would not return it under any 
circumstances as long as he is not compos mentis. Socrates then asks Polemarchus to 
rework what he believes Simonides to have meant. Polemarchus responds by stating that 
Simonides meant to say “he supposes that friends owe it to friends to do some good and 
nothing bad” (Republic 332a). The underlying principle is that “justice is giving benefits 
and harms to friends and enemies” (Republic 332d). Socrates leads Polemarchus toward a 
fallacy in this definition by asking in what scenario a just man could be of the greatest 
use. Polemarchus responds; “in my opinion it is in making war and being an ally in 
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battle” (Republic 332e). Socrates then asks if a just man is no longer useful in times of 
peace, since a doctor is not needed when one is healthy. Polemarchus responds that this is 
not what he intended to mean and that there are a number of uses for justice in times of 
peace (Republic 333a-b).  
The end result of this line of argument (Republic 333a-334a) is that Polemarchus 
is led to state justice “to be a certain art of stealing, for the benefit, to be sure, of friends 
and the harm of enemies” (Republic 334b). Socrates’ response can be broken down into 
three constituent parts. They are:  
1) In what manner is it useful for helping friends and hurting enemies (Republic 
332d-334b)? Specifically, justice is the art of giving the best help to friends and doing the 
worst harm to enemies in particular situations (Republic 333c-333e). If this view of 
justice is to be assumed, then justice is turned into something rather toothless (Republic 
333e). Therefore, it would seem best if, in Polemarchus’ construction of justice, it was 
some sort of marriage between art and intention.  
2) What defines a friend (Republic 334c-335b)? Since it is possible that we make 
mistakes in judging the character of our friends, it makes sense that in some cases the just 
man will be helping those who are bad and hurting those who are good—which is 
naturally the opposite of the intended goal. Here, Polemarchus sets about readjusting the 
scope of his definition of justice. The reformulation is “the man who seems to be, and is, 
good, is a friend, he said, and the man who seems good and is not, seems to be, but is not 
a friend. And we’ll take the same position about the enemy.” (Republic 334e).  
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3) Does it really belong to the just man to harm someone else (Republic 335b-
335e)
51
? Polemarchus agrees that he wants to be able to say that a just man can harm 
unjust men—this is obvious since it is the second part of his definition. Socrates leads 
Polemarchus to state that if horses and dogs are harmed, then they become worse in 
respect to the virtue of horses and dogs (Republic 335b). The next step is that humans 
who are harmed become worse in respect to the virtue of humans
52
 (Republic 335c). The 
virtue of humans, Socrates states and Polemarchus agrees, is justice. Polemarchus agrees, 
and Socrates asks if it is possible to make someone unmusical by means of music—
Polemarchus agrees that it is not (Republic 335c). The next analogy that Socrates wishes 
to make is that justice and musicality are of sufficient likeness that they operate the same 
way on the human mind. Therefore, the end result of this argument is that it is impossible 
to make men unjust by acting justly (Republic 335e). It is not the work of the just man to 
harm anyone, therefore, because acting justly cannot bring about its opposite. 
The last notion of justice that is addressed in Book I is Thrasymachus’. The claim 
Thrasymachus makes about justice is that, it is “nothing other than the advantage of the 
stronger” (Republic 338c). Justice is whatever the ruling class of a city says it is, and they 
always have created laws that are in their interest. Socrates points to a contradiction in 
Thrasymachus’ position here by demonstrating that sometimes rulers make the wrong 
decision and command people to do things that are actually to their disadvantage 
(Republic 339e).  
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 However, this movement of arguing by analogy may not be entirely persuasive. For it assumes that 
animals and humans will act in the same way to harm. Plato, in Book IV of the Republic, postulates the 
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Thrasymachus’ response chooses to redefine who the ‘stronger’ are by his 
definition. His amendment is that the “the ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, does not make 
mistakes; and not making mistakes, he sets down what is best for himself. And this must 
be done by the man who is ruled” (Republic 340e-341a). Thrasymachus narrows his 
definition of what a ruler is to the point that he creates a rather useless definition.  
Despite this, Socrates is able to convince Thrasymachus to admit that the crafts 
possess an art that is naturally directed toward its object. Thrasymachus agrees to 
Socrates’ assertion that no art requires another art to preside over, rather each art “being 
correct, is unblemished and pure so long as it is precisely and entirely what it is” 
(Republic 342b). This critique of Thrasymachus which Socrates may now use focuses on 
Thrasymachus’ analogy between art and rule
53
. Thus, he says: “Therefore Thrasymachus, 
I said, there isn’t ever anyone who holds any position of rule, insofar as he is ruler, who 
considers or commands his own advantage rather than that of what is ruled and of which 
he himself is the craftsman” (Republic 342e). Making the role of the ruler to necessarily 
consider everyone else’s needs except his own reflects the sort of moral behavior that 
Socrates and Plato aim for and desire from rulers and Thrasymachus necessarily wants to 
avoid.  
Thrasymachus attacks justice in the following sections (Republic 343a2-347e4). 
The nature and intensity of this attack on justice changes the tone of the whole dialogue, 
because Thrasymachus explicitly states justice to be a harm to the just man while 
injustice is a good (Republic 343c). Moreover, he claims that perfect injustice will make 
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the man who commits it “most happy” (Republic 334a3-5). To this especially hard 
critique of justice Socrates spends the rest of Book I giving a lengthy three part response 
(Republic 347e4-354a11). The three points of Socrates’ argument are thus: 1) that the just 
man is wise and good while the unjust man is ignorant and bad, 2) that justice is stronger 
than injustice, 3) that the just are happier and live better than the unjust, therefore, justice 
is more profitable than being unjust.  
The first book ends with the idea that it will not be possible to get a firm grasp of 
what is right and wrong with the popular notions, and to what degree they ought to be 
dismissed, until a much deeper and lengthier investigation is undertaken. The first Book 
is an essential part of the whole dialogue. Within it, Plato is able to dismiss two popular 
notions of justice and engage with the central issue that will take the rest of the Republic 
to solve.  
The Gauntlet  
As one might expect, right at the beginning of the second book the parameters for 
the rest of the dialogue are created. Glaucon states “Socrates, do you want to seem to 
have persuaded us, or truly to persuade us” (Republic 357b) referring to the arguments 
made in Book I. Any sort of conclusions that may be drawn from the end of the first book 
must be immediately questioned
54
 as Glaucon and Adeimantus desire what they believe a 
truly convincing concept of justice would be like to them, and Socrates has not presented 
a convincing argument. Socrates’ task, set out for him by Glaucon and Adeimantus, is to 
show that justice itself is the most desirable thing and the most just man, even if he is 
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perceived to be the most unjust man, has by far a better life than the most unjust man—
quite the heavy burden (Republic 361a-367e). The challenge begins with Glaucon who 
asks Socrates to show that someone seeming just is not more desirable than being just. He 
does this by constructing a scenario wherein Glaucon claims that perfect injustice is the 
ability to seem perfectly just while committing the worst crimes: 
For the height of injustice
 
is to seem just without being so. To the perfectly 
unjust man, then, we must assign perfect injustice and withhold nothing of 
it, but we must allow him, while committing the greatest wrongs, to have 
secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice (Republic 361a). 
He juxtaposes this perfectly unjust man with his opposite; a perfectly just man who seems 
to be the most unjust man: 
our theory must set the just man at his side—a simple and noble man, 
who, in the phrase of Aeschylus, does not wish to seem but be good. Then 
we must deprive him of the seeming.
 
For if he is going to be thought just 
he will have honors and gifts because of that esteem. We cannot be sure in 
that case whether he is just for justice' sake or for the sake of the gifts and 
the honors. So we must strip him bare of everything but justice and make 
his state the opposite of his imagined counterpart (Republic 361b-c). 
Adeimantus is not satisfied with Socrates simply proving that even in this case the just 
man has a better life. He requires that Socrates also demonstrate what each does to the 
man who possesses it: 
Do not then, I repeat, merely prove to us in argument the superiority of 
justice to injustice, but show us what it is that each inherently does to its 
possessor—whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and 
men—whereby the one is good and the other evil (Republic 367e). 
Once, Socrates has adequately showed the superiority of justice even in the worst of 
situations and has demonstrated what justice does to the one who possesses it, only then 
may the dialogue come to a successful conclusion. Book IV does not fulfill all of these 
requirements, leading to the lengthier arguments made in Books V-IX. Later in the 
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chapter I examine the definitions of justice put forward in Book IV and Book IX, attempt 
to understand why they are presented differently, and to what degree they answer the 
challenge set forward by Glaucon and Adeimantus.  
The City-Soul analogy’s Initial Presentation 
Directly after the challenge, a curious analogy is drawn between the structure of 
the individual soul and the city—commonly called the City-Soul analogy. Due to its 
proximity to the challenge, Plato must believe that this analogy is a requisite starting 
point for the arguments that he will make (Republic 368e-369a)
55
.  
“but what analogy to do you detect in the inquiry about justice?” “I will 
tell you,” I said: “there is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also 
of an entire city.” “Assuredly,” said he. “Is not the city larger than the 
man?” “It is larger,” he said. “Then, perhaps, there would be more justice 
in the larger object and more easy to apprehend (Republic 368e). 
It happens so quickly that at first glance it appears very easy to overlook, but on closer 
inspection it is the lynch-pin of the argument. The analogy is extraordinarily peculiar 
because it is an enormous foundation stone for the construction of Plato’s arguments, yet 
its validity is not put under any scrutiny at this point. Instead of arguing for the similarity 
between the make-up of the city and the soul, Socrates begins to create an outline for the 
ideal city. The City-Soul analogy as it is brought up in Book II only agrees that justice 
applies to both the city and the soul and goes no farther. We will have to wait until Book 
IV in order to get a detailed argument for the structural similarities between the city and 
the soul. This longer, more detailed, argument is needed to take the Homeric notion of 
justice, which is an act-centered theory of justice, and develop it into an agent-centered 
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theory of justice. Without a successful argument for the sufficient likeness of the parts of 
the city and the soul, Plato cannot extend justice to the individual level. This in turn is 
necessary for Plato to fully answer the challenge that Glaucon and Adeimantus put before 
him.  
First Critique of Poetry 
The first critique of poetry is born out of a concern for the education of the young 
men who will become the guardians of the ideal city. This first critique also deals with 
the notion of mimesis but in a far less expansive way as Socrates limits the poets’ 
mimetic action to imitating a character’s speech, looks, and creating a monologue for a 
character (Republic 393b-d). Socrates even gives an example of what a section of Homer 
may look like without any mimesis (393d-394a). The critique is not confined to Homer 
but deals with all types of poetry that are potentially harmful to the young guardians. 
What Socrates finds dangerous about poetry is that it not only promotes false virtues, but 
also makes these false virtues appear to be proper examples of moral behavior. These 
poetic texts are understood to be broadly political with the minds of the young guardians 
at stake (Griswold 2012).This critique, although, focuses on the moral development of 
children and Socrates expresses his disapproval poignantly: 
“Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer our children to listen to any chance 
stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds 
opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable 
for them to hold when they are grown up?” “By no manner of means will 
we allow it.” “We must begin, then, it seems, by a censorship over our 
storymakers, and what they do well we must pass and what not, reject. 
And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to 
tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories far rather than 
their bodies by their hands. But most of the stories they now tell we must 
reject” (Republic 377b-c). 
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This critique, allows for Homer to be taught as long as his material is appropriate. 
However, Plato spends the rest of Book II and a large section of Book III examining 
ways in which Homer does not teach correct morals (Republic 379c-d, 383a-b, 386b-
387b, 388a, 388b-d, 389e, 390a-d, 390e, 391a-c, 391e-392a) and debating whether to 
allow Homer into the city. In Book III Socrates expands the critique significantly where 
the ethical and psychological effects of poetry are first considered. The poets must not 
depict good men being frustrated with their own hardships (Republic 387e-388a). The 
poets also should withhold presentations of gods and heroes as being overwhelmed by the 
extremes of emotions; the strong soul isn’t overwhelmed by emotion and doesn’t suffer 
from a disharmony of the soul (Griswold 2012). Mimesis makes its entrance into the 
dialogue in Book III. A poet is acting mimetic when speaking as one of the characters in 
the poem with the goal of trying to make the audience believe that the character is 
speaking.  
At the end of the critique there is a noticeable bend toward attacking mimesis 
which will serve as the foundation of the later critique. It is interesting to note that the 
part of Plato’s critique of poetry concerning morals does not become categorical. Rather, 
that aspect of the critique can be evaded by a poet if they promote proper virtues for the 
young guardians. In other words, Plato finds faults with certain aspects of the ethics 
within the Homeric worldview. Plato does not force himself, though, to move entirely 
beyond all aspects of the Homeric worldview. This leaves the door open for Plato to 
borrow and expand upon aspects of this worldview which Plato believes to be useful. In 
the next section, I will demonstrate that one aspect of this Homeric worldview Plato 
borrows is the Homeric conception of justice. 
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Justice in Book IV: Homeric in Nature  
As I have said already, at the beginning of Book VIII we found out that the claim 
at the end of Book IV
56
 was premature (Republic 543c-544b). We know then that Book 
IV does not tell the whole story and the argument for justice is deepened by the material 
in Books V-IX. Interestingly, nowhere in the Republic does Socrates engage with a 
definition of justice that is seriously considered Homeric
57
. Homer is discussed often in 
the text
58
 but an extensive discussion of his view on justice is nonexistent. In this section 
I examine the nature of this first presentation of justice and demonstrate that it is 
fundamentally Homeric in nature. This borrowed Homeric justice is then expanded and 
built upon for the complete version of justice in Book IX. As I have argued in the first 
chapter of this thesis, justice in the Homeric epics can be defined using the definitions of 
justice presented in the first half of Book IV. This, in conjunction with the numerous 
other influences that the Homeric epics can be seen to have on the Republic leads me to 
believe that Plato borrowed the notion of justice in the Homeric worldview.  
I intend to use this understanding of justice to solve a controversy started by 
Sachs (1963): that while Glaucon and Adeimantus at the outset of Book II ask for a 
defense of justice as it is ordinarily understood, Socrates’ presentation of justice of the 
individual at the end of Book IV appears to have little to do with justice as it is ordinarily 
understood. My solution is that justice in the city is a formulation of Homeric justice, and 
that Socrates uses the City-Soul analogy to extend an ordinary conception of justice to the 
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individual at the end of Book IV. From Books V-IX Socrates deepens this understanding 
of justice so that it appears to be something more nuanced at the end of the Republic than 
it was in the beginning. Plato takes an ordinary social conception of justice and develops 
it into a personal virtue. The fully formed notion of justice that is presented in Book IX 
would be too overwhelming for the reader to just drop-in as Socrates is defining the 
virtues rather quickly and succinctly. Socrates needs to ease the reader into his complete 
understanding of justice which cannot be accomplished through Book IV alone.  
 In Book IV Socrates quickly, and surprisingly easily, defines the four virtues 
within the city. For an account of how the virtues function within the city see: for wisdom 
(428b–429a), for courage (429a–430c), for moderation (430e–432b), and for justice 
(432b–434d). Peculiarly though, directly after stating how difficult it will be to find 
justice, Socrates believes that he has found it, and furthermore, that they have been 
saying and hearing it all along (Republic 432e). If justice can be found so easily, then 
why doesn’t Socrates proceed to address the superiority of justice in a complete way, or 
what benefits justice brings the just man, or how it is greater than injustice? This would 
appear to be the next logical step toward moving the dialogue forward
59
. This almost 
appears to be the case, since he attempts to do this at the end of Book IV and the 
beginning of Book V but soon digresses into the lifestyle of the guardians. The Republic 
does not go in this direction and chooses, rather, to present justice in phases, connecting 
each of them with a series of arguments that strengthens the overall position of justice.  
As it is first postulated in the city, Justice is “[doing] one's own business and not 
to be a busybody” (Republic 433a).  Here, Plato describes justice as a harmony in society; 
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each citizen doing a task which they are naturally inclined to perform. Another way that 
Socrates phrases it is as “The proper functioning of the money-making class, the helpers 
and the guardians, each doing its own work in the state, being the reverse of that
 
just 
described, would be justice and would render the city just” (Republic 434c). Plato gives a 
definition of the just man as one who “from this point of view too, then, the having
 
and 
doing of one's own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice” (Republic 
433e-434a).  Closely following this agreement, Socrates believes that he has made a 
successful argument for the origin of justice in the city. Socrates states:  
And is not the cause of this to be found in the fact that each of the 
principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being 
ruled? Yes, that and nothing else. Do you still, then, look for justice to be 
anything else than this potency which provides men and cities of this sort? 
No, by heaven, he said, I do not (Republic 434b).  
Justice as it is defined here seems strikingly similar to Socrates’ earlier definition 
of moderation (Republic 430d-432b) (Weiss 2012, 181).  
Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing 
in separate parts respectively made the city, the one wise and the other 
brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally through the 
entire gamut throughout, bringing about the unison in the same chant of 
the strongest, the weakest and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if 
you please, in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any 
similar criterion. So that we should be quite right in affirming this 
unanimity to be soberness, the concord of the naturally superior and 
inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual. 
(Republic 431e-432b) 
The key to moderation is that the lesser, the middle, and the higher all are in agreement 
about which should rule. There are several close similarities between moderation and 
justice; the majority of which are that Socrates defines justice as he has defined 
moderation at the start by having the superior master the inferior (Republic 430-431), that 
he “[uses] nearly identical language and nearly identical metaphors for both—musical 
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metaphors such as sumphonia and harmonia and the high, low, and middle, placement on 
the musical scale, as well as the metaphor of friendship” (Weiss 2012, 181), and that both 
virtues extend throughout the whole soul (Weiss 2012, 181). At best, these similarities 
simply blur the line between the virtues because they share many common features, and 
at worst Socrates defines justice as moderation.  
 This overlap between the two virtues doesn’t quite seem to add up. Clearly, if the 
two virtues are one in the same, and Plato had intended this, then it would make much 
more sense to have defined them as one virtue. Further, it does not help him answer the 
challenge set before him in Book II. Since one of the goals of the Republic is to define 
justice correctly, then the complete, fully formed, and most robust definition of justice 
may not be as easily obtained as simply as wisdom, courage, or moderation.  
Weiss argues that because of all their similarities, justice and moderation are in 
fact the same virtue. This answer does not seem very plausible if only because this 
argument does not make more sense of the dialogue—in fact it makes it more opaque. 
There are other reasons as well; Weiss’ reading doesn’t help Socrates achieve anything, 
nor does it seem to make much sense to define two virtues in the same way. Put simply, it 
strikes the mind as unattractive. It is more plausible that the argument for justice is 
muddled, short, and incomplete in Book IV. If the initial presentation of justice is 
incomplete this could account for potential misreadings and overlaps between the virtues. 
With this reading, the incomplete argument appears to make the virtues more similar than 
they in fact are, while preserving the independence of the four virtues, and allowing for 
an expansion of thought through the remaining Books. In order to make a clear 
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distinction between moderation and justice, Socrates needs to use various parts of the 
arguments in Books V-IX. 
At the initial presentation of the City-Soul analogy, the analogy of keen 
sightedness is used to describe Socrates and his interlocutors’ pursuit (Republic 368c-e). 
At this point the City-Soul analogy is used to then examine the virtues in the city and 
extend those virtues to the soul. As Socrates states, once the other virtues are defined they 
must act like hunters closing in on a prey so that it doesn’t escape them (Republic 432b-
c). He goes further; “And truly, said I, it appears to be an inaccessible place, lying in deep 
shadows. It certainly is a dark covert” (Republic 432c).  
Directly after Socrates defines justice and injustice in the city, he turns to 
reinvestigate the City-Soul analogy (Republic 434d-e). The just man will not be different 
from the city with respect to justice (Republic 435b). The city is just when each of the 
three classes minds its own business and is wise, courageous, and moderate (Republic 
435b). Socrates then wants to claim that justice in the single man is just in the same way 
and for the same reasons as the city (Republic 435b-c). The issue at hand, then, is 
whether the soul has the same number of parts, in recognizably the same relations to one 
another, as in the city.  The solution to this problem is that there are three parts of the soul 
because there are three different types of desires that come into conflict with one another. 
There are desires that are independent of one’s understanding of the good—this is 
appetite. There are desires that a person understands to be required by one’s conception 
of the good—this is reason. These two types of desires are argued for by showing the 
strife between the two sorts of desires (Republic 437b-439e). There are also desires that 
involve some understanding of what good is but not an understanding of something that 
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is on the whole good—this is spirit
60
. It occupies a middle ground between the two other 
desires (Republic 439e-441b). After separating out the different types of desires that exist 
within an individual and that they correspond to aspects of the city, Socrates is able to 
claim that the city and the soul are of sufficient likeness that justice in the city will 
correspond to justice in the individual:  “the same kinds equal in number are to be found 
in the state and in the soul of each one of us” (Republic 441c).
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After this Socrates is able to explain that a just man sets his soul in order and 
harmonizes the three parts of the soul (Republic 443c-e). Injustice, then, is a sort of 
faction between the three parts (Republic 444b). From here Socrates states that healthy 
things produce health and sick things produce sickness (Republic 444c). Socrates uses 
this to reword his definition of justice as being the health of the soul and injustice being 
the sickness of the soul: 
But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural 
relation of dominating and being dominated
 
by one another, while to cause 
disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary 
to nature. Yes, that is so. And is it not likewise the production of justice in 
the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and 
being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule 
or be ruled by the other contrary to nature? Exactly so, he said. Virtue, 
then, as it seems, would be a kind of health and beauty and good condition 
of the soul, and vice would be disease,
 
ugliness, and weakness (Republic 
444d-e). 
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As I argued in the first chapter, the Homeric worldview’s conception of justice is act-
centered. Heroes and gods act justly when they are doing the tasks to which they are 
allotted, and the first wording of justice in Book IV for Plato is the same “the having
 
and 
doing of one's own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice” (Republic 
433e-434a).  This may be taken even as far as to see a link in the sense in which these 
tasks are ‘allotted’ in the Homeric epics and the Republic. In the Homeric epics, ‘doing 
what is allotted’ means one doing the tasks that will help maintain the order, balance, 
harmony of the cosmos. In the Republic, ‘doing what is allotted’ means doing one’s task 
so that the entire city might be properly harmonious. This notion, that doing these tasks 
so that a harmony can be achieved or maintained, runs through both of the conceptions of 
justice. While the contexts are different, there is a similar current that runs through both. 
The Homeric notion of justice is rawly borrowed only as far as Plato uses it in the 
first half of Book IV. Its focus is on intercommunal relationships and the acts that the 
heroes and gods perform. Plato uses the City-Soul analogy to take this conventional form 
of justice and extends it to the soul by showing that the soul has the same number of 
parts, in the same relation to one another, as in the city. The claim that the notion of 
justice that Socrates argues for is conventional is supported by his ‘discovery’ of it 
(Republic 432d-e) since it appears that there was not much need to go far searching for it: 
All the time, bless your heart, the thing apparently was tumbling about our 
feet
 
from the start and yet we couldn't see it, but were most ludicrous, like 
people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands. So we did 
not turn our eyes upon it, but looked off into the distance, which perhaps 
was the reason it escaped us. What do you mean? he said. This, I replied, 
that it seems to me that though we were speaking of it and hearing about it 
all the time we did not understand ourselves
 
 or realize that we were 
speaking of it in a sense (Republic 432d-e)  
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In Book IV, at first Plato can be seen to use the Homeric notion of justice, and 
eventually with the help of the City-Soul analogy extend it to the soul. By using the City-
Soul analogy, Socrates is able to take an act-centered theory of justice ‘doing what is 
allotted’ and extend it to the agent as ‘the health of the soul’. The analogy acts as the 
bridge that connects the Homeric worldview’s notion of justice to the Platonic version of 
justice which is developed from Book V on. In Book IV, Socrates has given only an 
incomplete reply to the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus. In order to complete the 
challenge in Book II a persuasive account of the personal virtue of justice needs to be 
forwarded as well as a persuasive argument why a person is always happier being just 
rather than unjust. In Book IV Socrates describes justice, but the arguments for the 
superiority of justice begin in Book V and culminate in Book IX. The arguments in the 
successive books build upon the groundwork that was done in Book IV and the 
representation of justice at the end of Book IX shows a richer, more complex and fully 
formed notion of justice that fulfils the nature of the challenge in Book II. 
Books V-VII: The Metaphysical Books 
 At the end of Book IV the number of possible regimes in the city and the soul is 
mentioned (Republic 445c-e) and it would appear that the next logical step in Book V 
would be to elaborate on them as this would be the quickest way to address Glaucon and 
Adeimantus’ challenge. This appears to be the direction of the dialogue until 
Polemarchus and Adeimantus state that Socrates is “trying to cheat
 
us out of a whole 
division, and that not the least, of the argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it” 
(Republic 449c). Those things are what will be held in common, namely women and 
children (Republic 449c). At first glance this appears to be quite a diversion, since a 
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discussion of these things cannot help forward the arguments for justice. This discussion 
eats up a substantial portion of the fifth Book leading eventually to a point that begins to 
have significance for this thesis.  
This specific line of questioning stems from a worry posed to Socrates regarding 
the feasibility of the ideal city on earth; “But
 
I fear, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go 
on in this fashion, you will never get to speak of the matter you put aside in order to say 
all this, namely, the possibility of such a polity coming into existence, and the way in 
which it could be brought to pass.” (Republic 471c). Socrates’ response is that the only 
way such a regime could come into existence would be if philosophers ruled (Republic 
473c-e). Socrates is then pushed to define what a philosopher is. Socrates first clarifies 
what one means when one claims one is a desirer of something; “When we say a man is 
[a desirer of]
62
 something, shall we say that he has an appetite for the whole class or that 
he desires only a part and a part not?” (Republic 475b). With this definition a philosopher 
is a desirer of all of wisdom and not just a part of it (Republic 475b). Philosophers are 
distinguished from lovers of sights and sounds by the depth of interaction that each has 
with sights and sounds; philosophers interacting with the Forms of what the sights and 
sounds participate in.  
The lovers of sounds and sights, I said, delight in beautiful tones and 
colors and shapes and in everything that art fashions out of these, but their 
thought is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of 
the beautiful in itself. Why, yes, he said, that is so. And on the other hand, 
will not those be few who would be able to approach beauty itself and 
contemplate it in and by itself? (Republic 476b). 
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Further, the lover of sights and sounds is dreaming while the lover of wisdom is actually 
awake; since the man who believes that there is something fair itself and can distinguish 
it from what things participate in it, and believes that the participant is not the thing itself 
is actually awake and not dreaming (Republic 476b-d).  
This leads to a clarification of the differences between knowledge, opinion, and 
ignorance which is a crucial step toward the Theory of Ideas which is posited in Book VII 
(Republic 476c-478e). Knowledge and ignorance are opposites of one another and 
opinion lies in between them. In this definition, knowledge depends entirely on what is 
true, for something to be known that thing must exist (Republic 476e-477a). If one knows 
something, in the Platonic sense, then that person cannot be wrong. What is most 
important—for the purpose of this thesis—is that only philosophers have knowledge.  
Forms are the only things that fully measure up to the standards of what truly is. 
Knowledge is directed toward interaction with the Forms. Book V ends by distinguishing 
between lovers of opinion and philosophers who love things that really are: 
 Shall we then offend their ears if we call them doxophilists
 
rather than 
philosophers and will they be very angry if we so speak? Not if they heed 
my counsel, he said, for to be angry with truth is not lawful. Then to those 
who in each and every kind welcome the true being, lovers of wisdom and 
not lovers of opinion is the name we must give. By all means (Republic 
480a). 
Book V serves to clarify the definition of knowledge and Plato’s definition of a 
philosopher, both of which provide solid ground for Socrates to build toward his 
arguments in favor of the superiority of justice over injustice.  
Book VI opens by using this definition of the philosopher as justification for 
philosophers being guardians (Republic 484b-485a). Further, because of their grasp of 
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Forms, they have an ability which no one else has, and moreover, because they are the 
ones who have real knowledge there is no need of any other rulers of cities (Republic 
484a). This must be the case because one cannot rule well without knowledge. Later in 
Book VI Socrates discusses the quality of souls and how ones that have the potential for 
the best nature can turn exceptionally worse than souls that do not have the potential for 
the best nature (Republic 491d-e). This makes the most just man and the most unjust man 
more similar than previously thought, as the quality of souls is judged in a way that may 
be characterized as Homeric. Achilles is judged to be the best of the Achaeans because he 
is the best fighter, and engrained into this view is the notion that one who has the ability 
to do more, based on a Hero’s raw attributes, is greater. This appears to be the same way 
that Socrates is looking at the nature of souls in Book VI. This is the reason that men who 
have the ability to be philosophers do not always become so; family, friends and the 
entrapments of the non-philosophical life lead them to abandon what is deemed to be the 
best pursuit (Republic 494b-495c). Although there is no city on earth that is structured 
such that the philosopher will rule, if it ever came to fruition, then it would clearly be the 
best regime (Republic 497b-c). The ability of the philosopher’s soul to degenerate and not 
strive for its potential is necessary for the story Socrates tells in Books VIII-IX as the 
descent from the aristocratic city and man to the tyrannical city and man is chronicled. It 
also foreshadows the definition of injustice in Book X; namely that injustice is the 
sickness of the soul (Republic 609b-c).  
Plato’s much discussed theory of Ideas
63
 serves many purposes. The focus here 
will be on how the Theory of Ideas and the rest of Book VII affect the ultimate goal of 
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the Republic. The general layout of the Allegory of the Cave
64
 is that there are prisoners 
who are chained facing a wall in a cave. They rely exclusively on shadows cast by statues 
and other objects which are artificial images of real things in the world outside of the 
cave for their understanding. At some point, there is a philosopher who is released from 
his chains and is led up to the outside world. How the philosopher was released from his 
bonds is not explained. Presuming that the cave represents a non-ideal city, the fact that 
this is not explained makes a lot of sense. In this city, there is no mechanism for a 
philosopher to emerge (Republic 519a-b). He absorbs knowledge of the Forms and then 
descends back into the cave.  The philosopher’s ascent from the cave and the realm of 
sensible objects toward the realm of intelligible Forms demonstrates the intellectual 
progress that occurs with philosophical inquiry. Upon his descent back into the cave, the 
philosopher no longer plays the guessing games of the prisoners and is ridiculed by them; 
who would kill them if they could (Republic 516e-517a). Properly understood, the cave is 
meant to be an allegory of our educational state (Republic 514a; Sedley 2013; 262). 
Later in Book VII there is a lengthy discussion on philosophers. In it, Plato 
attempts to demonstrate that philosophers will make the best rulers. Dialectic both plays 
an important role in the selection of the guardians (Republic 537c) and, as it is practiced 
in current society, is extremely dangerous (Republic 537e). Dialectic attempts to 
understand the being of things (Republic 533b). In order for Plato to describe someone as 
dialectical, that person must be able to distinguish, in an account, the Form of the Good 
from everything else and be able to survive all attacks (Republic 534b-c).  
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The nature of dialectic is so dangerous though, that Plato believes it should be 
restricted to those who are properly trained, have the right type of soul, and are of a 
certain age
65
 (Republic 539a-c). The proper type of soul is a guardian. The one who is to 
be taught dialectic must be of a certain age because young people will misuse the tool and 
refute beliefs until they disbelieve what they previously had believed (Republic 539b), 
while an older person is more likely to imitate looking for the truth (Republic 539c). The 
proper training of one who is to be taught dialectic is outlined through Book VII but it 
bears no relevance on the current thesis. This book solidifies specifically the Theory of 
Ideas, provides an argument that gives credence to the claims made in Books V and VI 
that the philosopher is the one who has knowledge and that because of this the 
philosopher has an obligation to educate and rule. Through the middle Books of the 
Republic, the philosopher is shown to be the best ruler based on their knowledge of 
Forms and their nature, and justice is made reliant on knowledge of its Form. The 
superiority of the philosopher in Books V-VII sets the stage for the argument described as 
“the greatest and most decisive overthrow” (Republic 583b) of injustice)—the argument 
about pleasure in Book IX. 
 
Books VIII and IX: The Psychological Books 
The special place that reason ought to have in the soul and that the philosopher 
ought to have in the city sets up the arguments made in Books VIII, which describe the 
‘devolution’ from the aristocratic city and man to the tyrannical city and man. Book VIII 
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is largely concerned with the processes by which a person or city may devolve from one 
regime to another lower one. For a description of the regimes discussed in Book VIII see: 
for the timocratic city, or son, and how it would come about from an aristocratic city, or 
father, and its descent (Republic 545c-550c), for the oligarchic city, or son, and how it 
would come about from a timocratic city, or father, and its descent (Republic 550c-557a), 
for the democratic city, or son, and how it would come about from an oligarchic city, or 
father, and its descent (Republic 557a-564a), for the tyrannical city, or son, and how it 
would come about from a democratic city, or father,  and a description of it (Republic 
564a-569c). While Book VIII is fascinating, the trajectory of the book is rather 
straightforward and its contents have few implications on the arguments of this thesis and 
will be largely unmentioned except with reference to specific instances that play into 
other aspects of the Republic. 
In Book IX, Socrates gains traction in his argument against the tyrant and for the 
superiority of justice. It must be remembered how ambitious a task Socrates was asked to 
accomplish. He has to show that justice is a greater good than injustice, even if the 
normal consequences of justice are flip-flopped with injustice. The most just man must 
appear as the most unjust man and vice versa. The fulfillment of this challenge comes in 
Book IX as Socrates describes and examines the life of the most unjust person, the tyrant. 
In the process more is drawn out of the definition of justice than in Book IV, making 
justice appear richer than originally presented. 
The tyrant is allowed to let his erotic desires reach their maximum, leading them 
to become impossible to satisfy and making the tyrant constantly frustrated (Republic 
579d-e). Additionally, the tyrant must eventually fear reprisals for his wrongs and this 
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leads to continuous mistrust of everyone around him (Republic 576a, 579a-c). The tyrant 
is unable to properly rule himself as the different parts of his soul are not kept in their 
proper place and he is in constant internal strife (Republic 573d). Clearly the tyrannical 
life, as it is portrayed, is not a model life that someone would wish to lead and looks quite 
differently than it is so favorably portrayed as in Book II. Plato’s depiction of the tyrant’s 
life is built upon the picture that Glaucon and Adeimantus painted to make the tyrant’s 
life appear attractive. The discussion in Book IX expands on what was inherent in the 
conception of the most unjust man (Kraut 1992; 326). Furthermore, Socrates 
demonstrates that the tyrannical man is by necessity impoverished, insatiable, and the 
most wretched man of all (Republic 577e-578b). The most unjust life at this point has a 
difficult time appearing more enjoyable than the most just life and the situation becomes 
more complicated. The situation for the most just man becomes more appealing than the 
situation for the most unjust man, because of his possession of knowledge of the Forms.  
At this point Socrates has already claimed that only the philosopher has real 
knowledge, and in Book IX Socrates claims that the philosopher is the only proper judge 
of the quality of different pleasures. There are two different arguments that Socrates 
forwards concerning pleasure. They are exceptionally difficult arguments to fully grasp 
because Plato never explicitly clarifies what is meant by pleasure. The first of the two 
arguments occurs in four steps: 1) just as each part of the soul has its own desires and 
pleasures, people have specific desires and pleasures depending on what part of the soul 
rules them
66
. 2) Each class of people claims that their pleasure is best. 3) Whoever has the 
better experience, argument, and reasons is correct. 4) The philosopher has the best 
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pleasure because he is the only one who has participated in all the different forms of 
pleasure and therefore is the best judge of which pleasure is greatest.  
This argument however does not explain why the distinction between the different 
types pleasure is made. For this reason Socrates puts forward another argument which is 
described as “the greatest and most decisive overthrow” (Republic 583b) of injustice. 
This occurs in three phases: 1) pleasure and pain are not contradictories but rather 
opposites, and there is a middle ground in between that is neither pleasure nor pain. In 
this way, removing pain can seem pleasurable and removing pleasure can seem painful, 
but this is only a deceptive appearance. 2) Most bodily pleasures remove a pain and are 
not real pleasures. 3) The philosopher’s pleasure does not remove a pain and are real 
pleasures.  
The philosopher at this point has been demonstrated to lead a more pleasurable 
life than the tyrant. The depiction of the tyrant shows that Plato’s argument does not rest 
only on the metaphysics of Books V-VII or the political theory of Books II-IV but rather 
builds on itself gradually making what was a social and act-centered theory of justice and 
extending it to the soul and then deepening this concept. While the theoretical arguments 
in favor of the just life come to a conclusion in Book IX, Socrates still believes that he 
needs to attack the poets and repel them from his city. At this point justice has been 
argued for, but Book X still makes the conception of justice more robust. 
Book X 
Before Plato could deny the poets access into the ideal city on epistemological 
grounds, Plato also needed his theory of Ideas in order to demonstrate the dangers of the 
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poets’ mimetic actions. In Plato’s system the material world is composed of the imitation, 
to varying degrees, of Ideas. This participation is only to an imperfect level, however, as 
a perfect participation would be the actual Idea. The critique of the poets centers on 
mimesis which is usefully defined as the “doing or making something that is like, and is 
intended to be like (i.e. imitating), something else in one aspect or another” (Marušič 
2011; 222). The English verbs that are most alike mimesis, context dependent, are 
‘imitate’ and ‘represent’ (Marušič 2011; 222). In Book X the poets are likened to the 
painters as Socrates claims:  
For it is necessary that the good poet, if he is going to make fair poems 
about the things his poetry concerns, be in possession of knowledge when 
he makes his poems or not be able to make them. Hence, we must consider 
whether those who tell us this have encountered these imitations and been 
deceived; and, whether, therefore, seeing their works, they do not 
recognize that these works are third from what is and are easy to make for 
the man who doesn’t know the truth—for such a man makes what look 
like beings but are not (Republic 598e-599a). 
In this part of book X, it is not yet clear in what manner poetry is characterized as 
mimesis nor what specifically about it is unreliable. For a clarification of this, Socrates 
compares the poets and the painters as Socrates argues:  
Now consider this very point. Toward which is painting directed in each 
case—toward imitation of the being as it is or toward its looks as it looks? 
Is it an imitation of looks or of truth? Of looks he said. Therefore imitation 
is surely far from truth (Republic 598b) 
Socrates goes on to say that while a painter “lays hold of a certain small part of 
each thing” (Republic 598b); he does not understand the arts of anything that he paints 
(Republic 598c). Therefore he could paint a carpenter, but this does not mean that the 
painter could make a hand-carved bed due to his lack of knowledge. Socrates argues that 
in just this same way, even though the poets describe things, in no way does this 
61 
 
demonstrate that they have true knowledge of a topic. The ultimate critique of the poets 
in Book X is to demonstrate that, just as it is naïve to believe that Homer’s narrations of 
the battle scenes are sufficient instruction in the art of war, it is also naïve to believe that 
the Homer’s narrations on ethical matters is sufficient (Ferrari 1989; 130, and Marušič 
2011; 239-240). The result is that the poets present us with a view of reality that is twice 
removed from the forms. They imitate or depict things in the material world which are 
only imperfect participants of Forms, trying to find truth in the poets is moving in the 
wrong direction. The poets can never bring us closer to the Forms, since we already exist 
one degree closer than what the poems depict. Therefore, reading the poets is useless 
from an educational standpoint and can only do us harm.  
Socrates changes the topic to the immortality of the soul (Republic 608c), after 
this wholesale dismantling of poetry. His interlocutors are astounded that the soul is 
immortal and can never be destroyed (Republic 608d). The general principle that Socrates 
lays down is “that which destroys and corrupts in every case is the evil; that which 
preserves and benefits is the good” (Republic 608e). They then seek the badness of the 
soul: 
Well, then, said I, has not the soul something that makes it evil? Indeed it 
has, he said, all the things that we were just now enumerating, injustice 
and licentiousness and cowardice and ignorance. Does any one of these 
things dissolve and destroy it? And reflect, lest we be misled by supposing 
that when an unjust and foolish man is taken in his injustice he is then 
destroyed by the injustice, which is the vice of soul. But conceive it thus: 
Just as the vice of body which is disease wastes and destroys it so that it 
no longer is a body at all, in like manner in all the examples of which we 
spoke it is the specific evil which, by attaching itself to the thing and 
dwelling in it with power to corrupt, reduces it to nonentity. Is not that so? 
Yes. (Republic 609b-d). 
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Socrates defines injustice as the vice of the soul, but this vice cannot destroy a soul 
because this would be a relief from evils, rather the effect of this vice is sleeplessness 
(Republic 610d-e). Soon afterward, Socrates demonstrates that if a man is truly just, then 
the gifts he receives from being just are better than the gifts received from seeming just 
(Republic 612b-d). Socrates’ argument for the immortality of the soul creates the Myth of 
Er; which acts as a cautionary tale for people to ensure that they know the dangers of the 
unjust life since the soul is immortal.  
Extending Homer  
 As I already stated, the conclusion drawn at the end of Book IV was premature, 
and is strengthened by the arguments made between Books V-IX. What is left to answer 
is how the argument for justice is strengthened, made deeper, and more robust between 
Books V-IX. Justice as it is presented in the first half of Book IV is Homeric and act-
centered in nature. By way of the City-Soul analogy, justice is reworded as the health of 
the soul by the end of Book IV and becomes something more than it was in Homer 
because it extends and exists beyond the social level. Yet, at this point justice is still 
argued for incompletely: Book IV hasn’t defined knowledge or discussed what the Good 
is
67
—both key components to filling in Plato’s conception of justice, nor do we have a 
full account of virtue which is incomplete without Books V-VII, nor in Book IV is there 
reason to believe that there will be a reexamination of the psychological premises of 
Book II in the later Books VIII-IX which will turn the tables on the unjust man. 
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Briefly, a schematic picture of the Republic, for the purposes of this thesis, might 
look something like this: Book I is an introduction, Books II-IV discuss political theory
68
, 
Books V-VII discuss metaphysics, Books VIII and IX discuss psychology, and Book X 
discuss the poets and the immortality of the soul. Although Books V-IX are necessary to 
complete the argument for justice, this does not mean that at the end of Book IV the 
reader has no reason to believe justice is superior to injustice. Rather, the conclusion 
reached in Book IV acts as a ‘place-holder’ so that the varying gaps can be filled in.  
In the middle books, the nature of knowledge and the Forms is illuminated. 
Further, it is made clear that the philosopher is the only person who is able to know 
anything or interact directly with the Forms. Because Forms are the greatest good (Kraut 
1992; 319), people must incorporate this new good into their lives by imitating them. 
Possession of the forms is necessary for true happiness and this is only possible through 
the use of reason. The philosopher is the only person who can achieve this and become 
truly just. Plato’s notion of justice is then deepened because it extends all the virtues. 
Only through knowledge of the Form of the virtue and imitating it can a person fully 
develop that virtue. Instead of justice only being the harmony of the classes of the city or 
the parts of the soul. It also contains an external reality that ought to be imitated. This 
imitation of the virtue will bring about the harmony of the different parts of the soul and 
classes of the city. 
Plato’s description of the tyrant clearly shows that justice buttressed by the 
political theory of the early books and the metaphysics of the middle books is also 
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heavily dependent on his portrayal of psychology. The tyrant ends up suffering unseen 
psychological pain as a result of his imbalance. The position of the tyrant is worse than 
the perfectly just man because the perfectly just man has access to the Forms which is the 
greatest good there is. The tyrant cannot access the greatest good and loses the contest for 
pleasure, turning the tables on the presentation of injustice in Book II. The just man’s 
situation inherently outweighs anything else because of the raw value of the Forms. 
Again, this bolsters justice to have more in its favor and presents a deeper picture of the 
nature of justice.  
Dahl claims at the end of his article on Plato’s defense of justice that “Plato 
cannot rightfully be praised for having a theory that avoids all of the problems that come 
with act-centered theories. If his agent-centered theory isn’t equivalent to a corresponding 
act-centered theory, it at least has an act-centered theory embedded in it” (Dahl 1991; 
831). Dahl concluded that within Plato’s theory of justice in the Republic there must be 
an act-centered theory. I argue that the act-centered theory that is embedded in Plato is 
the Homeric worldview’s conception of justice. By borrowing the Homeric Worldview’s 
conception of justice, Socrates can define justice in a conventional way that people will 
recognize, while developing this act-centered theory into an agent-centered theory as best 
he can. For this reason, while the picture of justice does not change through the Republic, 







In this thesis I have argued that the Homeric conception of justice is the same 
formulation of justice that is presented in the first half of Book IV. That there is not a 
shift in the moral tone of the Odyssey from the Iliad, and that by investigating the actions 
of the two protagonists of these epics a unity between them may be drawn. In the 
Republic, the way that Plato presents justice in Book IV and in Book IX is very similar; 
the main difference being the arguments that the conception of justice rely upon. In Book 
IX Plato shows an extension of the Homeric conception that is more developed and 
robust. However, I posit that the Homeric conception of justice in Book IV acts as a 
‘place-holder’ until Plato is able to fully argue for justice in the manner he wants. This 
argument takes up the bulk of Books V-IX. Using Homer’s notion of justice as a ‘place-
holder’ can be seen as a useful reading because the presentation in Book IX would have 
been so overwhelming that it could not properly be understood until a lengthy 
philosophical argument is made for it. This ‘place-holder’ allows Plato to spend the 
length of time necessary to lay the ground work for his real definition of justice in the 
Republic. If Plato had placed his definition of justice, from Book IX, in Book IV, it 
would be too complex and would seem to come out of thin air. Plato slowly introduced 
the audience of the Republic to his arguments. Only after Books V-IX is it possible for 
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